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1. On Post Quantum and Multivariate Cryptographies. Post Quantum Cryptography serves 
for the research of asymmetric cryptographical algorithms which can be potentially resistant 
against attacks based on the use of a quantum computer. The security of currently popular al-
gorithms is based on the complexity of three following known hard problems: integer factori-
za tion, discrete logarithm problem, and discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves. Each of 
these problems can be solved for the polynomial time by Peter Shor’s algorithm for a theoretical 
quantum computer. Though the known nowadays experimental examples of a quantum compu ter 
are not able to attack the currently used cryptographical algorithm, cryptographers already start-
ed researches of the postquantum security. They have also count on the new results of general 
complexity theory.
The history of the international conferences on Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) started 
in 2006. We have to note that Post Quantum Cryptography differs from Quantum Cryptography, 
which is based on the idea of usage of quantum phenomena to reach a better security.
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We propose new multivariate cryptosystems over an n-dimensional free module over the arithmetical ring Zm based 
on the idea of hidden discrete logarithm for Zm
*. These cryptosystems are based on the hidden Eulerian equations. 
If m is a “sufficiently large” product of at least two large primes, then the solution of the equation is hard without 
knowledge of the decomposition of m. In the Postquantum Era, one can solve the factorization problem for m and 
the discrete logarithm problem for Zm
*. However, it does not lead to the straightforward break of such cryptosystem, 
because of the parameter α is unknown. Some examples of such cryptosystems were already proposed. We define their 
modifications and generalizations based on the idea of Eulerian transformations, which allow us to use asymmetric 
algorithms based on families of nonlinear multiplicatively injective maps with prescribed polynomial density and 
degree bounded by constant.
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Modern PQC is divided into several directions such as Multivariate Cryptography, Lat ti-
ce-based Cryptography, Hash-based Cryptography, Code-based Cryptography, and studies of 
isogenies for superelliptic curves.
The oldest direction is Multivariate Cryptography (see [1]), which uses a polynomial map 
of the affine space Kn defined over a finite commutative ring into itself as encryption tools. It 
exploits the complexity of finding a solution of a system of nonlinear equations for many variab-
les. Multivariate cryptography uses, as security tools, nonlinear polynomial transformations 
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2( , , ..., ), ( , , ..., ), ..., ( , , ..., )n n n n nx f x x x x f x x x x f x x x→ → →  acting on the affine space 
Kn, where 1 2: [ , , ..., ], 1, 2, ...,i nf K x x x i n=  are multivariate polynomials given in the standard form, 
i. e., via the list of monomials in a chosen order. Important ideas in this direction are given in [2]. 
The density of a map F is the maximal number den(F) of monomial terms of , 1, 2, ...,if i n= . We 
say that den(F) is polynomial, if this parameter has size O(nd) for some positive constant d. The 
degree deg(F) of the map F is the maximal value of degrees , 1, 2, ...,if i n= .
Let F be a map of Kn to itself, which has the polynomial density of size 11
dC n and the poly-
nomial degree of size 22
dC n . Then the value of F on the tuple 1 2( , , ..., )nb b b  can be computed by 
1 2 1( )d dO n + +  basic operations of the ring. The current task is the search for an algorithm with re-
sistance to cryptoanalytic attacks based on the ordinary Turing machine. Multivariate cryptography has 
to demonstrate the practical security algorithm, which can compete with RSA and Diffie—
Hellman protocols, which are popular methods of elliptic curve cryptography (see [1, 2]).
It is a still young promising research area with the current lack of known cryptosystems 
with the proven resistance against attacks with the use of ordinary Turing machines. Studies of 
attacks based on a Turing machine and a quantum computer have to be investigated separately, 
because of different nature of two machines, deterministic and probabilistic, respectively. Let K 
be a commutative ring. S(Kn) stands for the affine Cremona semigroup of all polynomial trans-
formations of the affine space Kn. Multivariate cryptography started from studies of the poten-
tial for a special quadratic encryption multivariate bijective map of Kn, where K is an extension 
of a finite field Fq of characteristic 2. One of the first such cryptosystems was proposed by Imai 
and Matsumoto, and the cryptanalysis for this system was invented by J. Patarin. The survey on 
various modifications of this algorithm and corresponding cryptanalysis can be found in [1]. 
Various attempts to build a secure multivariate public key were unsuccessful, but the research 
of the development of new candidates for secure multivariate public keys is going on (see, e. g., 
[3] and references therein).
Applications of Algebraic Graph Theory to Multivariate Cryptography were recently pre-
sented in [4]. This survey is devoted to algorithms based on bijective maps of affine spaces into 
ourselves. Applications of algebraic graphs to cryptography started from symmetric algorithms 
based on explicit constructions of the extremal graph theory and their directed analogs (see sur-
veys [4, 5]). The main idea is to convert an algebraic graph in a finite automaton and to use pseu-
dorandom walks on a graph as encryption tools. This approach can be also used for the key ex-
change protocols. Nowadays, the idea of "symbolic walks" on algebraic graphs, when the walk on a 
graph depends on parameters given as special multivariate polynomials in variables depen ding on 
a plainspace vector, brings several public key cryptosystems. Other source of graphs suitable for 
cryptography is connected with finite geometries and their flag system. Bijective multivariate spar se 
encryption maps of a rather high degree based on walks in algebraic graphs were proposed in [5].
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One of the first usages of a nonbijective map of multivariate cryptography in the oil and 
vinegar cryptosystem was proposed in [6] and analyzed in [7]. Nowadays, this general idea is 
strongly supported by work [8] devoted to the security analysis of direct attacks on modified un-
balanced oil and vinegar systems. This algorithm was patented. It seems that such systems and 
schemes of rainbow signatures may lead to promising Public Key Schemes of Multivariate En-
cryption defined over finite fields. Nonbijective multivariate sparse encryption maps of degrees 
of at least 3, which are based on walks on algebraic graphs D(n, K) defined over general commu-
tative rings, and their homomorphic images were proposed in [9]. A new cryptosystem with non-
bijective multivariate encryption maps of the affine space nmZ  into itself was presented at the in-
ternational conference DIMA 2015. It uses the plainspace *( )nmZ , where n = k (k–1)/2, k >1, can 
be any natural number.
The private key space is formed by a sequence of general multivariate polynomials from 
1 2 ( 1)[ , , ..., ]m kZ x x x −  and a sequence of parameters , 1, 2, ..., 1il i k= − , which are mutually prime 
with )(mϕ . The properties of the encryption map depend strongly on the prime factorization of 
m. This nonbijective encryption map is the deformation of a special computation generated by 
the Schubert automaton of “k–1 dimensional projective geometry” over Zm. This method does not 
use the partition of variables into groups, and the nonbijective nature of the map is caused by 
zero devisors of a composite integer m. In fact, the idea of multiple “hidden RSA” is used (see 
[10]). The other algorithm exploited the “hidden RSA” idea is described in [11]. In Section 2, we 
introduce a concept of multiplicatively injective maps, Eulerian diagonal maps, and the idea of 
their use for the construction of cryptosystems. 
2. On Eulerian public key schemes. We refer to the equation x bα =  in the arithmetical ring 
Zm as an Eulerian equation, if ( , ) 1mα = . We say that the multivariate map :
n n
m mF Z Z→ is an 
Eulerian map of rank r, if F is injective on *( )r n rm mZ Z
−ω = , the parameter r is minimal with this 
property, and each equation F (x) = b is reducible to the solution of r Eulerian equations. The first 
examples of such maps can be found in [11] (rank 1) and [10] (case of arbitrarily large rank).
In this paper, we suggest a scheme based on the following idea of a diagonal Eulerian trans-
formation of the affine space over Zm. We say that the polynomial map G of 
n
mZ  to 
n
mZ  is multip li-
catively injective, if its restriction on *( )nmZ  is injective. So, bijective polynomial maps and Eule-
rian maps of rank > 0 are multiplicatively injective. Let us consider a transformation 
1 2( , , ..., )nA i i i
τ  
of nmZ  to itself of kind i ix y→ , where
11
1 1
,ai iy x=
21 22
2 1 2
a a
i i iy x x= ,
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 2
1 2
...n n nn
n n
a a a
i i i iy x x x= ,
where ( , ( )) 1iia mϕ =  for ,1, 2, ..., ; ( )i ji n a m= ϕ , and the sequence L of elements 1 2, , ..., ni i i  is a 
permutation of 1, 2, ..., n . Let A be a triangular matrix with entries jia ,  as above. We refer to a map 
of kind ( , )A L Sτ , where S is a monomial linear transformation ( )i i ix xπ→ λ , for which iλ  is an ele-
ment of * , 1, 2, ...,mZ i n= , and π is a permutation of (1, 2, ..., )n , as a monomial Eulerian map ( , )A L SEτ .
We say that τ is an Eulerian element, if it is a composition of several monomial Eulerian 
maps. It is clear that τ sends the variable xi to a certain monomial term. The decomposition of τ  
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into a product of Eulerian monomial transformations allows us to find a solution of the equa-
tions ( )x bτ =  for x from *( )nmZ . Really, we have to find bk from the condition ( )k kb bτ =  and to 
compute bk–1 from the condition 1 1( )k k kb b− −τ = , …, x = b1 from the condition 1 1 2( )b bτ = .
Assume that a polynomial transformation F of nmZ  written in the standard form has a po ly-
nomial degree d (maximal degree of monomial terms) and a polynomial density. We can take a 
bi jective affine map T of nmZ  onto itself and form the map G FT= τ of a finite degree bounded by 
some linear function of the variable n.
We refer to G as an Eulerian deformation of F. If F has the density of size O(nt), then the 
density of G is O(n t+1). It is clear that the Eulerian deformation of a multiplicatively injective 
map is also a multiplicatively injective transformation.
Let us consider the asymmetric encryption scheme based on the pair F, D, where F is a multi-
plicatively injective transformation of *( )nmZ  into 
n
mZ  and D is the data (private key), which al-
lows one to solve the equation F (x) = b for x from Ω  = *( )nmZ  for the polynomial time. As usual, 
Alice has (F, D) and the public user Bob has only a map F in the standard form. So, Bob forms the 
plaintext p from Ω  and sends the ciphertext c = F (p) to Alice. She uses D and solves F (x) = c 
for the unknown tuple x for the decryption.
Let us consider a modification of the above scheme via the Eulerian deformation G FT= τ . 
Alice will use new data D′ obtained by adding the maps τ, S, T to D. Alice sends the encryption 
rule G to the public user Bob. He sends c = G (p). Alice computes d = T–1(c). She forms the tuple 
of unknowns y = (y1, y2, …, yn). She uses the data D to get the solution b of F (y) = d. Finally, she 
computes b′ as S–1 (b) and gets the plaintext as a solution of the Eulerian system ( )x b′τ = .
This scheme can be applied to various known pairs (F, D), where F is a bijective map. For 
instance, we can take a stable cubic transformation of Kn into itself defined in [12] or [13] in 
the case where K = Zm for the chosen parameter m or nonstable maps [6].
Here, we concentrate on the Eulerian maps of rank s, when D contains information on the 
triangular system of Eulerian equations
11
1 11 1 1 1
( )i ih x a x b c
α
= + = ,
21 22
1 2 11 22 2 2 2
( , ) ( )i i ii ih x x a x x b x c
α α
= + = ,
. . . . . . . . .
1 2
1 2 1 2 11 2
( , , ..., ) ... ( , , ..., )s s ss
s sss i i i s s i i i si i i
h x x x a x x x b x x x c
−
α α α
= + = ,
1 1 2 11 2 [ ] [ , , ..., ]
, , ..., , , 1, 2, ...,
sm m x s m x x x j
b Z b Z b Z a j s
−
∈ ∈ ∈ = , are regular elements of Zm, i1, i2, …, is is 
a permutation of {1, 2, …, s}, 11( , ( )) 1, 1,2, ...,m i sα ϕ = = .
We refer to the map 
1 2
: ( , , ...., ), 1, 2, ...,
sj j i i i
F x h x x x j s→ = , as a triangular Eulerian map. As-
sume that , 1, 2, ...,ii i sα = , are unknown. Other coefficients are available together with the solu-
tion d1, d2, …, ds. Then finding , 1, 2, ...,ii i sα = , can be done via the consecutive solution of the 
discrete logarithm problem:
1 1 1 1( ) /
xd c b a= −  and 11
1
11 2 2 2 1 2, ( ) / d
xx d c b d aα= α = −  and
1, 111 22
22 1 2 1 1 2 1, ..., ( ( , , ..., )) / ( ... )
s sx
s s s s s sx d c b d d d a d d d
− −
αα α
−
−
= α = − .
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In the case where m is a large prime integer, the determination of a discrete logarithm is the 
known hard problem. In the case where m is a product of at least two large primes, the solution of a 
triangular Eulerian system is hard without knowledge of the factorization problem for integer m.
Note that the parameters ,i jα (as well as a i, j of the diagonal affine transformation) will be 
unknown for the public user Bob in the above-described cryptosystem. So, we can talk on the 
hidden discrete logarithm problem and the hidden factorization problem for integer m.
Example 1. Let us consider a cryptosystem based on the deformation of the above-written 
Eulerian triangular map F of nmZ .
The map F is defined by the parameters 1 2, , ..., na a a  from 
*
mZ , triangular matrices A, and the 
list of elements 
1 1 2 1 2 11 2 1 [ ] 3 1 2 [ , ] 1 2 1 [ , , ..., ]
, ( ) , ( , ) , ..., ( , , ..., )
mm m z m z z n m m z z z
b Z b z Z b z z Z b z z z Z
−
−
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ . 
Polynomials bi of constant degrees ti can be specially chosen to make the density of F of the 
presc ri bed size O (nd) for a certain constant d. We can choose a matrix A to make the degree 
of F bounded by some constant t.
Alice takes a sequence of triangular matrices A1, A2, Ak and linear orders L1, L2, …, Lk 
on 1, 2, …, n to form Eulerian diagonal transformations ,i iA Lτ  of constant degree ti . She takes 
strings 1 2, , ...,
i i i
nλ λ λ  and permutations iπ to form monomial linear transformations Si, i = 1, 2, …, k. 
Alice chooses a matrix B and a vector c to form a bijective affine transformation T sending x = (x1, 
x2, …, xn) into xB + c.
Alice computes the polynomial map 
1 1 2 2, 1 , 2 ,
, , ,
k kA L A L A L k
G S S S FT= τ τ … τ and writes G in 
the standard form. The degree of G is bounded by t1t2 … tkt and its density is of size O (n
t+1).
Alice sends the standard form of G to the public user Bob.
He writes a plaintext p = (p1, p2, …, pn) from ( )nmZ . He computes the ciphertext G (p) and 
sends to Alice. She uses her knowledge on the decomposition 
1 1 2 2, 1 , 2 ,
, , ...,
k kA L A L A L k
G S S S FT= τ τ τ . 
So, she computes c0 = T–1(c). She solves the equation F (z) = c0 for z. Note that the solution 
ck is an element of 
*
mZ . Alice gets the solution ck – 1 of the equation 
1
, ( )k kA L k kS c
−τ = . She creates 
inductively ck–j as a solution 1 1
1
, 1 1( )k j k jA L k j k jS c− + − +
−
− + − +τ =  for j = 2, 3, …, k – 1. We can see that 
c1 is a plaintext.
Example 2. Let K be a commutative ring. We define A (n, K) as a bipartite graph with the 
point set P = Kn and a line set L = Kn (two copies of a Cartesian power of K are used).
We will use brackets and parentheses to distinguish tuples from P and L. So (p) = (p1, 
p2, …, pn) from Pn and [l] = [l1, l2, …, ln] from Ln. The incidence relation I = A (n, K) (or correspond-
ing bipartite graph I) is given by condition (p) I [l] if and only if the following equations hold:
2 2 1 1p l l p− = ,
3 3 1 2p l p l− = ,
4 4 1 3p l l p− = ,
5 5 1 4p l p l− = ,
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 1n n np l p l −− =  for odd n,
1 1n n np l l p −− =  for even n.
Let us consider the case of finite commutative ring K, |K| = m. It instantly follows from the 
definition that the order of our bipartite graph A(n, K) is 2mn. The graph is m-regular. Really, the 
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neighbor of a given point (p) is given by the above equations, where the parameters p1, p2, …, pn 
are fixed elements of the ring, and the symbols l1, l2, …, ln are variables. It is easy to see that the 
value for l1 could be freely chosen. This choice uniformly establishes values for l2, l3, …, ln. So, each 
point has precisely m neighbors. In a similar way, we observe the neighborhood of the line, which 
also contains m neighbors. We introduce the color ( )pρ  of the point (p) and the color [ ]lρ  of the 
line [l] as the parameters p1 and l1, respectively.
Graphs A (n, K) with coloring ρ  belong to the class of linguistic graphs defined in [14]. In the 
case of linguistic graph γ , the path consisting of its vertices v0, v1, v2, …, vk is uniquely defined by 
the initial vertex v0 and colors ( )iρ ν , i = 1, 2, …, k, of other vertices from the path. So, the fol-
lowing symbolic computation can be defined. Take the symbolic point (x) = (x1, x2, …, xn), where xi 
are variables, and the symbolic key is a string of polynomials f1 (x), f2 (x), …, fs (x) from K [x].
Form the path of vertices v0 = x, v1 such that v0Iv1, and ρ(v1) = f 1(x1), v2 such that v1Iv2 and 
ρ (v2) = f2 (x1), …, vs such that vs–1Ivs and ρ(vs) = fs (x1).
We use the term symbolic point-to-point computation in the case of even k and talk on the 
symbolic point-to-line computation in the case of odd k. We note that the computation of each 
coor dinate of vi via the variables x1, x2, …, xn and polynomials f1 (x), f2 (x), …, fs (x) needs only 
the ari thmetical operations of addition and multiplication. The final vertex vs (point or line) 
has coordinates 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2( ( ), ( , ), ( , , ), ..., ( , , ..., ))n ng x g x x g x x x g x x x , where g1 (x1) = fs (x1) 
1 1 1( ) ( )sg x f x= .
Assume that the equation fs(x) = b has at most one solution under the condition that 
| ( , ) 1x t t m∈ = . Then the map 1 2: ( , , ..., )i iH x h x x x→  is a multiplicatively injective map. If 
the equation fs (x) = b, mx Z∈  has the unique solution, then H is a bijection.
In the case of a finite parameter s and finite densities of fi(x), i = 1, 2, …, s, the map H also has fi nite 
density. If all parameters deg (fi (x)) are finite, then the map H has a linear degree. For simplicity, 
we set fs (x) = ax r + b, where ( , ( )) 1r mϕ =  and (a, m) = 1. This means that we can substitute the 
kernel of a map F in the case of Example 1 by the map H. The map 
1, 2, ,1 2
1 2...L L s LsA A A kHT
G S S S= τ τ τ
written in the standard form has linear density and constant degree.
Let Ng(x) be the operator on P, and L be the operator sending the vertex (x1, x2, …, xn) (point 
or line) to its neighbor of color g(x1). In the case of symbolic key defined via the choice of f1 (x) 
and the recurrent relations f{i+1}(x) = gi (fi (x)), i = 1, 2, …, s–1, the map H is a com po sition of 
N1 = Nf1(x), N2 = Ng1(x), N3= Ng2(x), …, Ns = Ngs—1(x). So, in the case of bijective map, N1N2 … Ns is 
an example of the invertible decomposition of H in sense of [4].
The following cases of maps with prescribed density can be also used for the implementations.
1) Let, in the case of even s, we have fi (x) = h (x) + bi for odd i = 1, 3, …, s–1, where h (x) 
has chosen degree α. For even i = 2, 4, …, s, we set fi (x) = x + ci. From results of [15], we can de-
duce that the degree of H is 2 1α+ . It is easy to see that H is bijective. Let T1 be a bijective affine 
transformation of the free module nmZ . One can take the composition H1 = T1H. Independently 
of the size of s = l (n), the degree of H1 is t = 2 1α+ . So, its density is O (nt).
This means that we can substitute the kernel of a map F in the case of Example 1 by the 
map T1H. The map 1 1 2 2, 1 , 2 , 1... s sA L A L A L sG S S S H T= τ τ τ  written in the standard form has density 
O (nt+1).
2) Let us choose the odd parameter s. As in the case above, fi (x) = h (x) + bi for odd i = 1, 3, … , 
s, and, for even i = 2, 4, …, s–1, the equalities fi (x) = x + ci hold. We set h (x) = axr + b, and a is from 
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*
mZ . So the map H is multiplicatively injective. We can check that the degree of H is t = 2 1α+ .
 Let T2 be a bijective affine transformation of 
n
mZ of kind 1 1x x→ λ , x2 = l2(x1, x2, …, xn), x3 = l3 (x1, 
x2, …, xn), …, xn = ln (x1, x2, …, xn), where *mZλ∈  and li from Zm [x1, x2, … , xm] are of degree 1. 
We set H2 = T2H. The encryption map 1 1 2 2, 1 , 2 , 2... s sA L A L A L sG S S S H T= τ τ τ  has density 3( )O nα+ .
The paper is dedicated to the memory of V.I. Sushchansky, whose research and teaching gave the 
outstanding contribution to the development of Group Theory in Ukraine and Poland.
This research is patially supported by the grant PIRSES-GA-2013-612669 of the 7th Frame work 
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ПРО КРИПТОСИСТЕМИ ВІД БАГАТЬОХ ЗМІННИХ, 
ЩО ГРУНТУЮТЬСЯ НА ПРИХОВАНИХ РІВНЯННЯХ ЕЙЛЕРА
Подано нові криптосистеми від багатьох змінних, визначені на n-вимірному вільному модулі над арифме-
тичним кільцем лишків Zm, що грунтується на ідеї прихованого дискретного логарифма. Такі криптосис-
теми базуються на прихованих рівняннях Ейлера ,( , ) 1x a mα = α = . Якщо m є достатньо великим добутком 
щонайменше двох великих простих чисел, то розв’язок рівняння являє собою важкорозв’язну задачу за 
умови, що розклад числа m на дільники невідомий. У постквантову епоху задача факторизації розв’язується 
за поліноміальний час. Цей факт не призводить до безпосереднього зламу такої криптосистеми, тому що 
параметр α невідомий. Деякі приклади таких криптосистем розглядалися раніше. Запропоновано їх мо-
дифікації та узагальнення, які дають можливість використовувати асиметричні алгоритми, що базуються 
на родинах мультиплікативно ін’єктивних відображень із наперед заданою поліноміальною щільністю та 
степенем, обмеженим сталою.
Ключові слова: постквантова криптографія, криптографія від багатьох змінних, публічні ключі, прихова-
ний дискретний логарифм, приховані рівняння Ейлера, алгебраїчні графи, оцінки складності.
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О КРИПТОСИСТЕМАХ ОТ МНОГИХ ПЕРЕМЕННЫХ, 
ОСНОВАННЫХ НА СКРЫТЫХ УРАВНЕНИЯХ ЭЙЛЕРА
Представлены новые криптосистемы от многих переменных, определенные на n-мерном свободном моду-
ле над арифметическим кольцом вычетов Zm, основанном на идее скрытого дискретного логарифма. Эти 
криптосистемы основываются на скрытых уравнениях Эйлера ,( , ) 1x a mα = α = . Если m является доста-
точно большим произведением двух или более больших простых чисел, то решение уравнения составляет 
труднорешаемую задачу при условии, что разложение числа m на делители неизвестно. В постквантовую 
эру задачу факторизации можно решить за полиномиальное время. Этот факт не приводит к непосред-
ственному взлому такой криптосистемы, так как параметр α неизвестен. Некоторые примеры таких крип-
тосистем рассматривались раньше. Предложены их модификации и обобщения, которые позволяют ис-
пользовать асимметричные алгоритмы, базирующиеся на семьях мультипликативно инъективных отобра-
жений с наперед заданной полиномиальной плотностью и степенью, ограниченной константой.
Ключевые слова: постквантовая криптография, криптография от многих переменных, публичные ключи, 
скрытый дискретный логарифм, скрытые уравнения Эйлера, алгебраические графы, оценки сложности.
